





from
Person
to
People



Kitty Genovese



The Bystander Effect



Kitty Genovese

The Bystander Effect

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1968, Vol. 6, No. 4, 277-283

BYSTANDER INTERVENTION IN EMERGENCIES:


DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY¹

JOHN M. DARLEY and BIBB LATANÉ
New York University *Columbia University*

Subjects overheard an epileptic seizure. They believed either that they alone heard the emergency, or that 1 or 4 unseen others were also present. As predicted the presence of other bystanders reduced the individual's feeling of personal responsibility and lowered his speed of reporting ($p < .01$). In groups of size 2, males reported no faster than females, and females reported no slower when the 1 other bystander was a male rather than a female. In general, personality and background measures were not predictive of helping. Bystander inaction in real-life emergencies is often explained by "apathy," "altruism," and "anomie." This experiment suggests that the explanation may lie more in the bystander's response to other observers than in his indifference to the victim.

1968 ACADEMY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES
This article is intended to provide information on the progress of research in psychology and related fields. It is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the literature. It is intended to be a summary of the current state of knowledge in the field. It is intended to be a guide to the literature. It is intended to be a resource for students and researchers alike.

The Bystander Effect



(Darley & Latané, 1968)

Questions + Themes

How do **groups** affect our **behavior** toward others?


How quickly and easily do we form **impressions** of other people?


How pervasive and consequential are **group stereotypes**?

Are groups a force for **good** or for **evil**?











Minimal Group Paradigm



Henri Tajfel
(1919-1982)



Fewer resources
Lower favorability
Enjoy outgroup failures





Categorization: Helpful, efficient, **fast**



“Thin Slicing”



Nalini Ambady
(1959-2013)

“Thin Slicing”



“Thin Slicing”


TEACHER COURSE EVALUATIONS

Each term, teacher course evaluations are conducted for the main purpose of supplementing the guidance of professors, academic advisors and student peers in the course selection process. They are also an instrumental tool for improving the quality of the instruction students receive. Traditionally, teacher course evaluations were conducted using paper forms; however, in fall 2011, the Krieger School of Arts and Sciences and the Whiting School of Engineering began conducting evaluations online using EvaluationKit.

How ‘thin’?

- A. One lecture
- B. Twenty minutes
- C. Five minutes
- D. Thirty seconds
- E. Six seconds

Group bias
+ diffusion of responsibility
+ categorization
+ snap judgments...



Implicit Bias Is Real. Don't Be So Defensive.
Mike Pence heard an accusation of bigotry, not an acknowledgment of human nature.
By William Saletan

Leadership / #IBOnlyKnew
3 Strategies To Change Implicit Biases In A Negotiation
Alexandra Dickson, Contributor
Full Bio

Implicit Bias

Health & Medicine
'Implicit bias' may account for a glaring disparity in health care screening
PR's The World
February 09, 2017 - 4:30 PM EST
By Cristina Quinn

This story is a part of
GlobalNation
STORIES OF A CHANGING AMERICA AND ITS PEOPLE



Implicit Bias

Explicit Bias


Implicit Bias

bias we don't (or **can't**) verbally express
(because we may not know it exists!)



Heart
or
Diamond



Spade
or
Club





Heart
or
Diamond




Spade
or
Club

Heart
or
Club



Spade
or
Diamond



Heart
or
Club



Spade
or
Diamond



White
or
Good



wonderful terrible
amazing horrifying
positive negative



Black
or
Bad

White
or
Good






Black
or
Bad

White
or
Bad


Black
or
Good

terrible



Race
Age
Sexuality
Weight
Disability
Gender
Gender-Science
Gender-Career

**So what?
What's half a second?**




ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION

Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon


B. Keith Payne
Washington University

Two experiments used a priming paradigm to investigate the influence of racial cues on the perceptual identification of weapons. In Experiment 1, participants identified guns faster when primed with Black faces compared with White faces. In Experiment 2, participants were required to respond quickly, causing the racial bias to shift from reaction time to accuracy. Participants misidentified tools as guns more often when primed with a Black face than with a White face. L. L. Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure was applied to demonstrate that racial primes influenced automatic (A) processing, but not controlled (C) processing. The response deadline reduced the C estimate but not the A estimate. The motivation to control prejudice moderated the relationship between explicit prejudice and automatic bias. Implications are discussed on applied and theoretical levels.









(Payne, 2001)

Hiring

Qualifications	Experience	Description	Pregnancy Advice
Strong	Team captain, disciplinary board	Sensitive, intelligent, relaxed	Explain options, offer phone # of health center
Moderate	Team captain	Sensitive, intelligent, very emotional	Offer phone # of health center
Weak	Chess captain	Independent, forthright, intense	Don't ask me, talk to your parents

Race: Candidate is either a member of a **fraternity** or the **Black Student Union**

Hiring

Would you recommend the candidate?

Strong and **Weak** qualifications:
No effect of race

Moderate qualifications:
"Fraternity" (76%) preferred over
"Black Student Union" (45%)

(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000)

Implicit Bias

Effects especially likely when decisions are:

- **Fast** (e.g. shoot or don't shoot)
- **Ambiguous** (e.g. hiring with unclear criteria or borderline qualifications)
- **Subtle** (e.g. how far to sit, how long to talk)



<http://implicit.harvard.edu>

- Race
- Age
- Sexuality
- Weight
- Disability
- Gender
- Gender-Science
- Gender-Career

“Dark Side”
of Groups

“Light Side”?





Prisoner's Dilemma



Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate		
	Defect		

Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate	1: Two years 2: Two years	
	Defect		

Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate	1: Two years 2: Two years	1: One year 2: Ten years
	Defect		

Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate	1: Two years 2: Two years	1: One year 2: Ten years
	Defect	1: Ten years 2: One year	

Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate	1: Two years 2: Two years	1: One year 2: Ten years
	Defect	1: Ten years 2: One year	1: Six years 2: Six years

Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate	1: Two years 2: Two years	1: One year 2: Ten years
	Defect		

Prisoner's Dilemma


		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate		
	Defect	1: Ten years 2: One year	1: Six years 2: Six years

Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate	1: Two years 2: Two years	1: One year 2: Ten years
	Defect	1: Ten years 2: One year	1: Six years 2: Six years

Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate	1: \$2 2: \$2	1: \$3 2: \$0
	Defect	1: \$0 2: \$3	1: \$1 2: \$1





Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player 1	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 2	Cooperate	1: \$2 2: \$2	1: \$3 2: \$0
	Defect	1: \$0 2: \$3	1: \$1 2: \$1

Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Player 2	Player 1	
	Cooperate	Defect
	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	1: \$2 2: \$2	1: \$3 2: \$0
Defect	1: \$0 2: \$3	1: \$1 2: \$1

Player 1	Player 2	
	Cooperate	Defect
	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	1: \$2 2: \$2	1: \$3 2: \$0
Defect	1: \$0 2: \$3	1: \$1 2: \$1

Prisoner's Dilemma



Prisoner's Dilemma

 COPYCAT 3	 CHEATER 3
 COOPERATOR 3	 GRUDGER 3
 DETECTIVE 3	 COPYKITTEN 3
 SIMPLETON 3	 RANDOM 4

Prisoner's Dilemma

 <p>ALWAYS CHEAT: <i>the strong shall eat the weak</i></p>	 <p>ALWAYS COOPERATE: <i>Let's be best friends! <3</i></p>
✓ 	<p>COPYCAT: Hello! I start with Cooperate, and afterwards, I just copy whatever you did in the last round. Meow</p>

Prisoner's Dilemma

 <p>ALWAYS CHEAT: <i>the strong shall eat the weak</i></p>	 <p>ALWAYS COOPERATE: <i>Let's be best friends! <3</i></p>
✓ 	<p>COPYCAT: Hello! I start with Cooperate, and afterwards, I just copy whatever you did in the last round. Meow</p>
✓ 	<p>COPYKITTEN: Hello! I'm like Copycat, except I Cheat back only after you Cheat me twice in a row. After all, the first one could be a mistake! Purr</p>

Prisoner's Dilemma

It **pays** to be nice when your reputation is on the line



COPYKITTEN:
Hello! I'm like Copycat, except I Cheat back only after you Cheat me twice in a row. After all, the first one could be a mistake! Purrrrr

Ultimatum Game

\$7/\$3?

OK NO
(\$7/\$3) (\$0/\$0)

Proposer \$10 **Responder**

Public Goods Game



\$10



\$10

x3



\$10



\$10

Public Goods Game



\$5



\$5

\$20
x3



\$5



\$5

Public Goods Game



\$5



\$5

\$60
x3



\$5



\$5

Public Goods Game



\$20



\$20

x3



\$20



\$20

Public Goods Game



\$10



\$10

x3



\$10



\$10

Public Goods Game



\$9



\$5

\$16
x3



\$5



\$5

Public Goods Game



\$9



\$5

\$48
x3



\$5



\$5

Public Goods Game



\$21



\$17

x3



\$17



\$17



LETTER

doi:10.1038/nature11467

Spontaneous giving and calculated greed


David G. Rand^{1,2,3}, Joshua D. Greene^{4*} & Martin A. Nowak^{1,2,4*}

Cooperation is central to human social behaviour¹⁻³. However, choosing to cooperate requires individuals to incur a personal cost to benefit others. Here we explore the cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making in humans using a dual-process framework^{4,5}. We ask whether people are predisposed towards selfishness, behaving cooperatively only through active self-control, or whether they are intuitively cooperative, with reflection and prospective reasoning favouring 'rational' self-interest. To investigate this issue, we perform ten studies using economic games. We find that across a range of experimental designs, subjects who reach their decisions more quickly are more cooperative. Furthermore, forcing subjects to decide quickly increases contributions, whereas instructing them to reflect and forcing them to decide slowly decreases contributions. Finally, an induction that primes subjects to trust their intuitions increases contribution compared with an induction that promotes greater reflection. To explain these results, we propose that cooperation is intuitive because cooperative heuristics are developed in daily life where cooperation is typically advantageous. We then validate predictions generated by this proposed mechanism. Our results provide convergent evidence that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemmas, and that reflection can undermine these cooperative impulses.

Many people are willing to make sacrifices for the common good^{6,7}. Here we explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying this cooperative behaviour. We use a dual-process framework, in which intuition and reflection interact to produce decisions⁸⁻¹⁰. Intuition is often associated with parallel processing, automaticity, effortlessness, lack of insight into the decision process and emotional influence. Reflection is often associated with serial processing, effortfulness and the

We recruited 212 subjects from around the world using the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)¹¹. AMT provides a reliable subject pool that is more diverse than a typical sample of college undergraduates (see Supplementary Information, section 1). In accordance with standard AMT wages, each subject was given US\$0.40 and was asked to choose how much to contribute to a common pool. Any money contributed was doubled and split evenly among the four group members (see Supplementary Information, section 3, for experimental details).

Figure 1a shows the fraction of the endowment contributed in the slower half of decisions compared to the faster half. Faster decisions result in substantially higher contributions compared with slower decisions (rank-sum test, $P < 0.007$). Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 1b, we see a consistent decrease in contribution amount with





from
Person
to
People
